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Abstract
The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about
the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed
algorithms with rational agents have assumed that n, the size of the network, is a-priori known to
the participants. We investigate the above question, considering different distributed computing
problems and showing how much each agent must a-priori know about n in order for distributed
algorithms to be equilibria. The main tool considered throughout the paper is the advantage an
agent may gain by duplication- pretending to be more than one agent.
We start by proving that when no bound on n is given equilibrium for Coloring and Knowledge
Sharing is impossible. We provide new algorithms for both problems when n is a-priori known to
all agents, thus showing that there are algorithms in which the only way for an agent to gain an
advantage is duplication. We further show that for each distributed problem there is an a-priori
known range, an upper and a lower bound on n, such that if the actual n is guaranteed to lay in
that range, equilibrium is possible. By providing equilibria for a specific range, and impossibility
results for any larger range, we prove the tight range necessary for equilibrium in: Leader Election,
Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation.
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1 Introduction
The complexity and simplicity of most distributed computing problems depend on the inherent
a-priori knowledge given to all participants. Usually, the more information processors in a network
start with, the more efficient and simple the algorithm for a problem is. Sometimes, this information
renders an otherwise unsolvable problem, solvable.
We consider a network of rational agents [1, 4] who participate in an algorithm and may deviate
from it if they deem a deviation more profitable for them, i.e., the execution is more likely to output
their desired output. To differentiate from Byzantine faults, we require the Solution Preference
property that ensures agents never prefer an outcome in which the algorithm fails (e.g., terminates
incorrectly) over an outcome with a legal output. Previous works in this setting [4, 5, 22] assumed
agents a-priori know n, the number of agents in the network (henceforth called the actual number).
Our model is motivated by multi-agent protocols in which the participants may cheat in order
to achieve the result they think is best for them. Consider a distributed frequency assignment
(Coloring) between cellular network providers, in which each prefers a certain frequency (color) for
which it already has equipment or infrastructure. Companies may then cheat in the distribution
process in order for their preferred frequency to be assigned to them. Another example is an online
game, in which players start by selecting the player that will host the game and thus enjoy the best
network latency in the game to follow.
In this paper we examine the a-priori knowledge about n required for equilibrium in a distributed
network of rational agents, each of which has a preference over the output. Unlike the case in which
n is known, agents may also deviate from the algorithm by duplicating themselves to affect the
outcome. This deviation is also known as a Sybil Attack [17], commonly used to manipulate internet
polls, increase page rankings in Google [12] and affect reputation systems such as eBay [11, 13]. In
this paper, we use a Sybil Attack to prove impossibility of equilibria. For each problem presented,
an equilibrium when n is known is provided or was provided in a previous work, thus in these cases
deviations that do not include duplication cannot benefit the agents. Obviously, deviations from the
algorithm that include both duplicating and additional cheating are also possible.
The problems we examine here can be solved in standard distributed computing without any
knowledge about n, since we can easily acquire the size of the network by a broadcast and echo.
However, learning the size of the network reliably is no longer possible with rational agents and thus,
for some problems, a-priori knowledge of n is critical for equilibrium.
Intuitively, the more agents an agent is disguised as, the more power to affect the output of the
algorithm it has. For every problem, we strive to find the maximum number of duplications a cheater
may be allowed to duplicate without gaining the ability to affect the output, i.e., equilibrium is still
possible. This maximum number of duplications depends on whether other agents will detect that
a duplication has taken place, since the network could not possibly be this large. To detect this
situation they need to possess knowledge about the network size, or about a specific structure.
In this paper, we translate this intuition into a precise computation of the relation between
the lower bound α and the upper bound β = f(α) on n, that must be a-priori known in order
for equilibrium to be possible. We denote this relation f -bound. These bounds hold for both
deterministic and non-deterministic algorithms.
To find the f -bound of a problem, we first show what is the minimum number of duplications
for which equilibrium is impossible when n is not known at all, and then show an algorithm that is
an equilibrium when the amount of duplications is limited to that number, as well as when n itself
is a-priori known. Finally, we calculate the f -bound by balancing out the profit an agent may gain
by duplicating itself against the risk it takes of being caught.
Table 1 summarizes our contributions and related previous work (where there is a citation). A X
mark denotes that we provide herein an algorithm for this case, and an × denotes that we prove that
no equilibrium is possible in that case. Known n refers to algorithms in which n is a-priori known to
all agents. Unknown n refers to algorithm or impossibility of equilibrium when agents a-priori know
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no bound on n. The f -bound for each problem is a function f for which there is an equilibrium when
the upper and lower bounds on n satisfy α ≤ β ≤ f(α), and no equilibrium exists when β > f(α).
A problem is ∞-bound if there is an equilibrium given any finite bound, but no equilibrium exists if
no bound or information about n is a-priori given. A problem is unbounded if there is an equilibrium
even when neither n nor any bound on n is given.
Problem Known n Unknown n f -bound
Coloring X × ∞*
Leader Election
X
ADH’13 [4]
×
ADH’13 [4]
(α+ 1)
Knowledge Sharing X
AGLS’14 [5] ×
(2α− 2)*
2-Knowledge Sharing ∞*
Partition, Orientation X X Unbounded
Table 1: Summary of paper contributions, equilibria and impossibility results for different problems
with different a-priori knowledge about n
* f -bound proven for a ring graph
1.1 Related Work
The connection between distributed computing and game theory stemmed from the problem of secret
sharing [32]. Further works continued the research on secret sharing and multiparty computation
when both Byzantine and rational agents are present [2, 15, 18, 20, 21, 29].
Another line of research presented the BAR model (Byzantine, acquiescent [37] and rational)
[6, 31, 37], while a related line of research discusses converting solutions with a mediator to cheap
talk [2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 25, 30, 33, 35, 36].
Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern [4] were the first to present protocols where processors in the
network behave as rational agents, specifically protocols for Leader Election. In [5] the authors
continue this line of research by providing basic building blocks for game theoretic distributed
algorithms, namely a wake-up and knowledge sharing equilibrium building blocks. Algorithms for
consensus, renaming, and leader election are presented using these building blocks. Consensus was
researched further by Halpern and Vilaca [22], who showed that there is no ex-post Nash equilibrium,
and a Nash equilibrium that tolerates f failures under some minimal assumptions on the failure
pattern.
Coloring and Knowledge Sharing have been studied extensively in a distributed setting [7, 8, 14,
24, 26, 27, 34]. An algorithm for Knowledge Sharing with rational agents was presented in [5], while
Coloring with rational agents has not been studied previously, to the best of our knowledge.
2 Model
We use the standard message-passing model, where the network is a bidirectional graph G = (V,E)
with n nodes, each node representing an agent, and |E| edges over which they communicate. G
is assumed to be 2-vertex-connected1. Throughout the entire paper, n always denotes the actual
number of nodes in the network.
Initially, each agent knows its id and input, but not the id or input of any other agent. We
assume the prior of each agent over any information it does not know is uniformly distributed over
all possible values. Each agent is assigned a unique id, taken from the set of natural numbers.
1 This property was shown necessary in [5], since if such a node exists it can alter any message passing through
it. Such a deviation cannot be detected since all messages between the sub-graphs this node connects must traverse
through it. This node can then skew the algorithm according to its preferences.
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Furthermore, we assume all agents start the protocol together, i.e., all agents wake-up at the same
time. If not, we can use the Wake-Up [5] building block to relax this assumption.
2.1 Equilibrium in Distributed Algorithms
Informally, a distributed algorithm is an equilibrium if no agent at no point in the execution can do
better by unilaterally deviating from the algorithm. When considering a deviation, an agent assumes
all other agents follow the algorithm, i.e., it is the only agent deviating.
Following the model in [4, 5] we assume an agent always aborts the algorithm whenever it detects a
deviation made by another agent, even if the detecting agent can gain by not aborting. In this manner,
our notion of equilibrium is basically Bayes-Nash equilibrium2, but not sequential equilibrium [23].
We elaborate on this difference in the Discussion (Section 6).
Each node in the network is a rational agent, following the model in [5]. The algorithms produce
a single output per agent, once, at the end of the execution. Each agent has a preference only over
its own output.
Formally, let oa be the output of agent a, let Θ be the set of all possible output vectors, and
denote the output vector O = {o1, . . . , on} ∈ Θ, where O[a] = oa. Let ΘL be the set of legal output
vectors, in which the protocol terminates successfully, and let ΘE be the set of erroneous output
vectors, such that Θ = ΘL ∪ΘE and ΘL ∩ΘE = ∅.
Each agent a has a utility function ua : Θ → N. The higher the value assigned by ua to an
output vector, the better this vector is for a. To differentiate rational agents from Byzantine faults,
we assume the utility function satisfies Solution Preference [4, 5] which guarantees that an agent
never has an incentive to cause the algorithm to fail.
Definition 2.1 (Solution Preference). The utility function ua of an agent a never assigns a higher
utility to an erroneous output than to a legal one, i.e.:
∀a,OL ∈ ΘL, OE ∈ ΘE : ua(OL) ≥ ua(OE)
We differentiate the legal output vectors, which ensure the output is valid and not erroneous,
from the correct output vectors, which are output vectors that are a result of a correct execution of
the algorithm, i.e., without any deviation. The Solution Preference guarantees agents never prefer
an erroneous output. However, they may prefer a legal but incorrect output.
Recall that we assume agents only have preferences over their own output, i.e., for any O1, O2 ∈
ΘL where O1[a] = O2[a], ua(O1) = ua(O2). For simplicity, we also assume each agent a has a single
preferred output value pa, and we normalize the utility function values, such that
3:
ua(O) =
{
1 oa = pa and O ∈ ΘL
0 oa 6= pa or O ∈ ΘE
(1)
Our results hold for any utility function that satisfies Solution Preference.
Definition 2.2 (Expected Utility). Let r be a round in a specific execution of an algorithm. Let a
be an arbitrary agent. For each possible output vector O, let xO(s, r) be the probability, estimated
by agent a at round r, that O is output by the algorithm if a takes step s 4, and all other agents
follow the algorithm. The Expected Utility a estimates for step s in round r of that specific execution
is:
Es,r[ua] =
∑
O∈Θ
xO(s, r)ua(O)
2 In [4], sequential equilibrium is shown by an additional assumption on the utility function; however, if an agent
detects a deviation that does not necessarily lead to the algorithm failure, it is still not a sequential equilibrium.
3 This is the weakest assumption that satisfies Solution Preference, since it gives cheating agents the highest incentive
to deviate. A utility assigning a lower value for failure than oa 6= pa would deter a cheating agent from deviating.
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Note that agents can also estimate the expected utility of other agents by simply considering a
different utility function.
An agent will deviate whenever the deviating step leads to a strictly higher expected utility than
the expected utility of the next step of the algorithm. By the utility function 1, an agent will prefer
any deviating step that increases the probability of getting its preferred output, even if that deviating
step also increases the risk of an erroneous output.
Let Λ be an algorithm. If by deviating from Λ and taking step s, the expected utility of a
is higher, we say that agent a has an incentive to deviate (i.e., cheat). For example, at round r
algorithm Λ may dictate that a flips a fair binary coin and sends the result to all of its neighbors.
Any other action by a is considered a deviation: whether the message was not sent to all neighbors,
sent later than it should have, or whether the coin toss was not fair, e.g., a only sends 0 instead of a
random value. If no agent can unilaterally increase its expected utility by deviating from Λ, we say
that the protocol is an equilibrium. We assume a single deviating agent, i.e., there are no coalitions
of agents.
Definition 2.3 (Distributed Equilibrium). Let s(r) denote the next step of algorithm Λ in round r.
Λ is an equilibrium if for any deviating step s, at any round r of every possible execution of Λ:
∀a, r, s : Es(r),r[ua] ≥ Es,r[ua]
2.2 Knowledge Sharing
The Knowledge Sharing problem (adapted from [5]) is defined as follows:
1. Each agent a has a private input ia, in addition to its id, and a function q, where q is identical
at all agents.
2. A Knowledge Sharing protocol terminates legally if all agents output the same value, i.e.,
∀a, b : oa = ob 6= ⊥. Thus the set ΘL is defined as: O ∈ ΘL ⇐⇒ ∀a, b : O(a) = O(b) 6= ⊥.
3. A Knowledge Sharing protocol terminates correctly (as described in Section 2.1) if each agent
outputs at the end the value q(I) over the input values I = {i1, . . . , in} of all other agents5.
4. The function q satisfies the Full Knowledge property:
Definition 2.4 (Full Knowledge Property). A function q fulfills the full knowledge property
if, for each agent that does not know the input values of all other agents, any output in the
range of q is equally possible. Formally, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m, fix (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xm) and
denote zy = |{xj |q(x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xm) = y}|. A function q fulfills the full knowledge property
if, for any possible output y in the range of q, zy is the same
6.
We assume that each agent a prefers a certain output value pa.
2-Knowledge Sharing The 2-Knowledge Sharing problem is a Knowledge Sharing problem with
exactly 2 distinct possible output values.
2.3 Coloring
In the Coloring problem [14, 26], the output oa of each agent a is a color. ΘL is any O such that
∀a : oa 6= ⊥ and ∀(a, b) ∈ E : oa 6= ob.
We assume that every agent a prefers a specific color pa.
4 A step specifies the entire operation of the agent in a round. This may include drawing a random number,
performing any internal computation, and the contents and timing of any message delivery.
5Notice that any output is legal as long as it is the output of all agents, but only a single output value is considered
correct for a given input vector.
6The definition assumes input values are drawn uniformly, otherwise the definition of zy can be expanded to the
sum of probabilities over every input value for xj .
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3 Impossibility With No Knowledge
Here we show that without any a-priori knowledge about n, there is no algorithm that is an
equilibrium for both Knowledge Sharing and Coloring.
A fundamental building block in many algorithms is Wake-Up [5], in which agents learn the
graph topology. If n is not known at all, how can an agent be sure the topology it learned is correct?
Let a be a malicious agent with δ outgoing edges. A possible deviation for a is to simulate
imaginary agents a1, a2 and to answer over some of its edges as a1, and over the others as a2, as
illustrated in Figure 1. From this point on a acts as if it is 2 agents. Here we assume that the
id space is much larger than n, allowing us to disregard the probability that the fake id collides with
an existing id.
Note that an agent may be forced by the protocol to commit to its fake duplication early, by
starting the algorithm with a process that tries to map the graph topology, such as the Wake-Up
[5] algorithm. If an algorithm does not begin by mapping the topology, an agent could begin the
protocol as a single agent and duplicate itself at a later stage. This allows the agent to ”collect
information” and increase its ability to effect the output. Since a Wake-Up protocol can be added at
the beginning of every algorithm, we assume every algorithm starts by mapping the network, thus
forcing a duplicating agent to commit to its duplication scheme at the beginning of the algorithm.
Figure 1: Agent a acting as separate agents a1, a2
Regarding the output vector, notice that an agent that pretends to be more than one agent still
outputs a single output at the end. The duplication causes agents to execute the algorithm as if it
is executed on a graph G′ (with the duplicated agents) instead of the original graph G; however, the
output is considered legal if O = {oa, ob, . . . } ∈ ΘL rather than if {oa1 , oa2 , ob, . . . } ∈ ΘL.
It is important to emphasize that for any non-trivial distributed algorithm, the outcome cannot
be calculated using only private data without communication, i.e., for rational agents, no agent can
calculate the outcome privately at the beginning of the algorithm. This means that at round 0, for
any agent a and any step s of the agent that does not necessarily result in algorithm failure, it must
hold that: Es,0[uv] /∈ {0, 1} (a value of 0 means an agent will surely not get its preference, and 1
means it is guaranteed to get its preference).
In this section we label agents in graph G as a1, ..., an, set in a clockwise manner in a ring and
arbitrarily in any other topology. These labels are not known to the agents themselves.
3.1 Impossibility of Knowledge Sharing
Theorem 3.1. There is no algorithm for Knowledge Sharing that is an equilibrium in a 2-connected
graph when agents have no a-priori knowledge of n.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Λ is a Knowledge Sharing algorithm that is an equilibrium in
any graph without knowing n. Let D, E be two 2-connected graphs of rational agents. Consider
the execution of Λ on graph H created by D,E, and adding two nodes a1, a2 and connecting these
nodes to 1 or more arbitrary nodes in both D and E (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Graph H created by two arbitrary
sub-graphs D,E
Figure 3: Example of agent a pretending to
be E′ = E ∪ {a1, a2}
Recall that the vector of agents’ inputs is denoted by I = i1, i2, · · · , in, and n = |H| = |D|+|E|+2.
Let tD be the first round after which q(I) can be calculated from the collective information that all
agents in D have7, and similarly tE the first round after which q(I) can be calculated in E. Consider
the following three cases:
1. tE < tD: q(I) cannot yet be calculated in D at round tE . Let E
′ = E∪{a1, a2}. Since E ⊂ E′,
the collective information in E′ at round tE is enough to calculate q(I). Since n is not known,
an agent a could emulate the behavior of E′, making the agents believe the algorithm runs
on H rather than D. In this case, this cheating agent knows at round tE the value of q(I) in
this execution, but the collective information of agents in D is not enough to calculate q(I),
which means the output of agents in D still depends on messages from E′, the cheater. Thus,
if a learns that the output q(I) 6= pa, it can send messages that may cause the agents in D to
decide a value x 6= q(I). In the case where pa = x, agent a increases its expected utility by
sending a set of messages different than that decreed by the protocol. Thus, agent a has an
incentive to deviate, contradicting distributed equilibrium.
2. tD = tE : both E and D have enough collective information to calculate q(I) at the same
round. The collective information in E at round tE already exists in E
′ at round tE − 1. Since
tD = tE , the collective information in D is not enough to calculate q(I) in round tE − 1. Thus,
similarly to Case 1, a can emulate E′ and has an incentive to deviate.
3. tE > tD: Symmetric to Case 1.
Thus, Λ is not an equilibrium for the Knowledge Sharing problem.
When |D| = |E|, the proof of Theorem 3.1 brings us to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.2. When a cheating agent pretends to be more than n agents, there is no algorithm for
Knowledge Sharing that is an equilibrium when agents have no a-priori knowledge of n.
3.2 Impossibility of Coloring in a Ring
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the Full Knowledge property of the Knowledge Sharing problem,
i.e., no agent can calculate the output before knowing all the inputs. Recall that the Coloring
problem, however, is a more local problem [28], and nodes may color themselves without knowing
anything about distant nodes.
Theorem 3.3. There is no algorithm for Coloring that is an equilibrium in a 2-connected graph
when agents have no a-priori knowledge of n.
Proof. In order to show an incentive to deviate, we generalize the notion of expected utility. Recall
that an agent outputs a single color, even if it pretends to be several agents. In Coloring, a cheating
7 Regardless of the complexity of the computation.
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agent only wishes to influence the output color of its original neighbors to enable it to output its
preferred color while maintaining the legality of the output.
Definition 3.4 (Group Expected Utility). Let r be a round in an execution ε, and let M be a group
of agents. For any set S = {s1, . . . , s|M |} of steps of agents in M , let Ψ be the set of all possible
executions for which the same messages traverse the links that income and outgo to/from M as in ε
until round r, and in round r each agent in M takes the corresponding step in S. For each possible
output vector O, let xO be the sum of probabilities over Ψ that O is decided by the protocol. For
any agent v, the Group Expected Utility of uv by M taking steps S at round r in execution ε is:
EM,S,r[uv] =
∑
O∈Θ
xOuv(O).
Assume by contradiction that Γ is a Coloring algorithm that is an equilibrium in a ring with n
agents {a1, . . . , an}. Let G be a ring with a segment of k consecutive agents, k ≥ 3, all of which
have the same color preference p. Assume w.l.o.g., they are centered around an if k is odd and
around an, a1 if even. Let L be the group of agents {an−1, . . . , abn
2
c+1}, and R the group of agents
{a1, . . . , adn
2
e−1}. Denote L′ = L ∪ {adn
2
e, an} and R′ = V \ L′ (see Figures 4, and 5).
Figure 4: Ring with 3 colliding agents
a9, a10, a1 with groups L, R
Figure 5: Ring with 3 colliding agents with
groups L′, R′
Definition 3.5. Let Y be a group of agents (e.g., L or R). In any round r in an execution, let
Sr(Y ) denote the vector of steps of agents in Y according to the protocol. We say Y knows the
utility of agent a if it holds that EY,Sr(Y )[ua] ∈ {0, 1}. We say Y does not know the utility of agent
a if 0 < EY,Sr(Y )[ua] < 1.
Recall that at round 0 no agent (or group of agents) knows its utility or the utility of any other
agent. Consider an execution of Γ on ring G and the groups L,R in the following cases:
1. L does not know uan throughout the entire execution of the algorithm, i.e., for agents in L it
holds that 0 < Pr[on 6= p] < 1. Then if L is emulated by a cheating agent, it has an incentive
to deviate and set its output to p (as otherwise its utility is guaranteed to be 0).
2. L knows uan at some round tL, and R does not know uan before round tL. Consider round
tL − 1 and group L′: In round tL, L knows the utility of an, thus the collective information of
agents in L at round tL already exists in L
′ at round tL − 1. If L′ knows that uan = 1, then it
had already won; otherwise, L′ knows that uan = 0. Consider the group R′ ⊂ R, that does not
know uan at round tL − 1. If L′ is emulated by a cheating agent a, it can send messages that
increase its probability to output p, thus increasing its expected utility.
3. R knows uan before round tL: symmetric to Case 2.
By the contradictory example for a ring, there is no equilibrium for Coloring for 2-connected
graphs, thus Γ is not an equilibrium for the Coloring problem.
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4 Algorithms
Here we present algorithms for Knowledge Sharing (Section 4.1) and Coloring (Section 4.2). The
Knowledge Sharing algorithm is an equilibrium in a ring when no cheating agent pretends to be
more than n agents. The Coloring algorithm is an equilibrium in any 2-connected graph when
agents a-priori know n.
Using an algorithm as a subroutine is not trivial in this setting, even if the algorithm is an
equilibrium, as the new context as a subroutine may allow agents to deviate towards a different
objective than was originally proven. Thus, whenever a subroutine is used, its equilibrium should be
justified.
The full descriptions and proofs of the algorithms and Theorem 4.1 can be found in Appendix A,
in addition to a Coloring algorithm with improved time complexity.
4.1 Knowledge Sharing in a Ring
First we describe the Secret-Transmit building block in which agent a delivers its input ia at round
r to some agent b, and no other agent in the ring learns any information about this input.
Agent a selects a random number R and let X = R ⊕ ia. It then sends R clockwise and
X counter-clockwise until each reaches the agent before b. At round r − 1, each neighbor of b
simultaneously sends b the value it received, either X or R.
We assume a global orientation around the ring. This assumption can be easily relaxed via Leader
Election [5], which is an equilibrium in this application since the orientation has no effect on the
output. The algorithm works as follows:
All agents execute Wake-Up [5] to learn n′, the size of the ring which may include duplications. For
each agent a, denote b1a the clockwise neighbor of a, and b
2
a the agent at distance bn
′
2 c counter-clockwise
from a. All agents around the ring simultaneously use Secret-Transmit, each to transmit its input
secretly to its corresponding b1 and b2 so all arrive at their destination at the same round r = n′. At
round n′ + 1, each agent sends its input around the ring.
Theorem 4.1. In a ring, the algorithm above is an equilibrium when no cheating agent pretends to
be more than n agents.
4.2 Coloring
1. All agents execute Renaming [5] which gives new names 1, . . . , n to the agents. Since agents
strive to minimize their name’s numeral value, Renaming is still an equilibrium.
2. Each agent, in order of the new names, picks its preferred color if available, or the minimal
available color otherwise, and sends its color to all of its neighbors.
5 How Much Knowledge Is Necessary?
Here we examine the effects of a-priori knowledge that bound the possible value of n. We show that
the possibility of algorithms that are equilibria depends on the range [α, β] in which n might be, and
show these ranges for different problems.
Table 2 summarizes our results. Partition and Orientation have equilibria without any knowledge
of n; however, the former is constrained to even-sized rings, and the latter is a trivial problem in
distributed computing (radius 1 in the LOCAL model [27]).
Definition 5.1 ((α, β)-Knowledge). We say agents have (α, β)-Knowledge about the actual number
of agents n, α ≤ β, if all agents know that the value of n is in [α, β]. We assume agents have no
information about the distribution over [α, β], i.e., they assume it is uniform.
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Definition 5.2 (f -Bound). Let f : N→ N. A distributed computing problem P is f -bound if:
• There exists an algorithm for P that is an equilibrium given (α, β)-Knowledge for any α, β such
that β ≤ f(α).
• For any algorithm for P, there exist α, β where β > f(α) such that given (α, β)-Knowledge the
algorithm is not an equilibrium.
In other words, a problem is f -bound if given (α, β)-Knowledge, there is an equilibrium when
β ≤ f(α), and there is no equilibrium when β > f(α). A problem is ∞-bound if there is an
equilibrium given any bound f , but there is no equilibrium with (1,∞)-Knowledge. A problem is
unbounded if there is an equilibrium with (1,∞)-Knowledge.
Bound Problem (in a ring)
α+ 1 Leader Election8
2α− 2 Knowledge Sharing
∞ Coloring, 2-Knowledge Sharing
unbounded Partition, Orientation8
Table 2: Knowledge Bounds in a Ring; summary of results
Consider an agent a at the start of a protocol given (α, β)-Knowledge. If a pretends to be a group
of d agents, it can be caught when d+ n− 1 > β, since agents might discover the number of agents
and catch the cheater. Moreover, any duplication now involves some risk since the actual value of n
is not known to the cheater.
An arbitrary cheating agent a simulates executions of the algorithm for every possible duplication,
and evaluates its expected utility. Denote D a duplication scheme in which an agent pretends to
be d agents. Let PD = P [d + n − 1 ≤ β] be the probability, from agent a’s perspective, that the
overall size does not exceed β. If for agent a there exists a duplication scheme D at round 0 such
that ED,0[ua] · PD > Es(0),0[ua], then agent a has an incentive to deviate and duplicate itself.
The proofs of the following theorems and corollaries can be found in Appendix B. For each
problem we look for the maximal range of α, β where no d exists that satisfies the inequation above.
Knowledge Sharing
Theorem 5.3. Knowledge Sharing is (2α− 2)-bound.
Corollary 5.4. 2-Knowledge Sharing is ∞-bound.
Coloring
Theorem 5.5. Coloring in a ring is ∞-bound.
Leader Election In the Leader Election problem, each agent a outputs oa ∈ {0, 1}, where oa = 1
means that a was elected leader and oa = 0 means otherwise. ΘL = {O|∃a : oa = 1, ∀b 6= a : ob = 0}.
We assume that every agent prefers either 0 or 1.
Theorem 5.6. Leader Election is (α+ 1)-bound.
Ring Partition In the Ring Partition problem, the goal is to partition the agents of an even-sized
ring into two, equally-sized groups: group 0 and group 1. We assume that every agent prefers to
belong to either group 0 or 1.
Theorem 5.7. Ring Partition is unbounded.
8 These results hold in general graphs, as well.
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Orientation In the Orientation problem the two ends of each edge must agree on a direction for
this edge. We assume that every agent prefers certain directions for its edges.
Unlike Ring Partition, Orientation is defined for any graph. It is, however, a very local problem
(radius 1 in the LOCAL model [27]).
Theorem 5.8. The Orientation problem is unbounded.
6 Discussion
Distributed algorithms are commonly required to work in an arbitrarily large network. In a realistic
scenario, the exact size of the network may not be known to all of its members. In this paper, we have
shown that in most problems the use of duplication gives an agent power to affect the outcome of the
algorithm. The amount of duplications an agent can create is limited by the ability of other agents
to detect this deviation, and the only tool for this ability is a-priori knowledge about n. Section 3
shows that for some problems, without any such knowledge, distributed problems become impossible
to solve without any agent having an incentive to deviate from the algorithm.
The f -bounds we have proven for common distributed problems show that the initial knowledge
required for equilibrium to be possible depends on the balance between two factors: (1) The amount
of duplications necessary to increase an agent’s expected utility and by how much it increases, and
(2) the expected utility for an agent if it follows the protocol. In order for an agent to have an
incentive to duplicate itself, an undetected duplication needs to be either a lot more profitable than
following the algorithm or it must involve low risk of being caught.
Our results produce several directions that may be of interest:
1. Proving impossibility and f -bounds in general topology graphs, as for some of the problems
we only discussed ring networks.
2. Proving impossibility and showing algorithms for other problems with rational agents, which
result in other tight f -bounds.
3. Finding a problem that is α-bound, i.e., has an equilibrium only when n is known exactly.
4. What defines a trivial or non-trivial problem with rational agents? More specifically, finding a
characteristic that separates problems that can be solved without any knowledge about n from
ones in which at least some bounds must be a-priori known.
5. Finding an unbounded problem not inherently limited (as Orientation or ring Partition are),
or finding proof that no such problem exists.
6. Exploring the effects of initial knowledge about network size in an asynchronous setting.
7. Similar to [4, 5], our notion of equilibrium is basically Bayes-Nash equilibrium, but not sequential
equilibrium [23]. Sequential equilibrium removes the assumption that agents fail the algorithm
if they detect another agent cheating. In [4], the authors suggest an additional assumption
on agents’ utility functions in order to obtain sequential equilibrium; however, in case an
agent detects a deviation that does not necessarily lead to the algorithm failure, it still has no
incentive to cause the algorithm failure, and thus it is not a sequential equilibrium. It would
be interesting to find sequential equilibria and the problems for which they are possible.
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A Algorithms
A.1 Knowledge Sharing in a Ring
Here we present an algorithm for Knowledge Sharing that is an equilibrium in a ring when no cheating
agent pretends to be more than n agents. Clearly, when agents a-priori know n it is an equilibrium,
since a cheating agent is further constrained not to duplicate at all. At any point in the algorithm,
whenever an agent recognizes that another agent has deviated from the protocol it immediately
outputs ⊥ resulting in the failure of the algorithm.
We assume a global orientation around the ring. This assumption can be easily relaxed via Leader
Election [5]. Since the orientation has no effect on the output, Leader Election is an equilibrium in
this application.
According to Corollary 3.2, when a cheating agent pretends to be more than n agents, there is no
algorithm for Knowledge Sharing that is an equilibrium. On the other hand, the algorithm presented
here is an equilibrium when the cheating agent pretends to be no more than n agents, proving that
the bound is tight.
We start by describing the intuition behind the algorithm. Let n′ be the size of the ring, which
may include duplications. Since a cheater may be at most dn′2 e agents, our algorithm must ensure
that any group of dn′2 e consecutive agents never gains enough collective information to calculate
q(I), the output of Knowledge Sharing, before the collective information at the rest of the ring is
also enough to calculate q(I).
To ensure this property, we employ a method by which agent s delivers its input is to some agent
t at a specific round r, without revealing any information about is to any of the agents other than
s and t. This method is used by every agent to send its input to two other agents that are distant
enough to prevent a consecutive group of size dn′2 e from learning this input too early.
At round n′, the input values sent by this method are revealed simultaneously. Afterwards, every
possible group of dn′2 e consecutive agents had already committed to the inputs of all its members, so
it is too late to change them. Now every agent can simply send its input around the ring.
Figure 6: at round n′ − 1:
ia = R1 ⊕X1 = R2 ⊕X2; group C
does not know the input of a
Figure 7: the input that agents a6, . . . , a9
learn at round n′; each input of an agent in
C is known by an agent not in C
Algorithm 1 describes the Secret-Transmit building block. The building block is called by an
agent a and receives three arguments: its input ia, a round r, and a target agent b. It assumes
neighbors of b know they are neighbors of b. The building block delivers ia at round r to agent
b, and no other agent around the ring gains any information about this input. Additionally, agent
b learns the input at round r and not before. In the Secret-Transmit building block, agent a
selects a random number R and a value X, the XOR of its input ia with R. Each value is sent in
a different direction around the ring until reaching a neighbor of b. At round r − 1, both neighbors
14
send the values X and R to b, thus b learns ia at round r and no other agent around the ring has
any information about ia at round r.
Algorithm 1 Secret-Transmit(ia, r, idb)
1: Select a random number R
2: Let X = R⊕ ia
3: Send R clockwise until it reaches a neighbor of b . Each message counts down from r
Send X counter-clockwise until it reaches a neighbor of b . in order to know how long to wait
4: At round r − 1, each neighbor of b sends b the value it received, either X or R
Algorithm 2 solves Knowledge Sharing in a ring using the Secret-Transmit building block. All
agents simultaneously transmit their input, each to 2 other agents. For each agent a, the input ia
is sent using Secret-Transmit to its clockwise neighbor, and to the agent that is at distance bn′2 c
counter-clockwise from a. Note that these agents form the two ends of a group C of dn′2 e consecutive
agents that do not include a. This guarantees that if C is a cheater pretending to be dn′2 e ≤ n agents,
it does not learn the input ia before round r, since at least one piece of each transmission has not
reached any agent in C at any round < r. At round r, the agents in C already committed all of their
input values to some agents in the ring that are not in C.
Algorithm 2 Knowledge Sharing in a Ring
1: All agents execute Wake-Up [5] to learn the ids of all agents and n′, the size of the ring (which
may include duplications)
2: For each agent a, denote b1a the clockwise neighbor of a, and b
2
a the agent at distance bn
′
2 c
counter-clockwise from a
3: Each agent a simultaneously performs:
SecretTransmit(ia, n
′, b1a)
SecretTransmit(ia, n
′, b2a)
4: At round n′ + 1, each agent sends its input around the ring
5: At round 2n′ output q(I)
Theorem A.1. In a ring, Algorithm 2 is an equilibrium when no cheating agent pretends to be more
than n agents.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that a cheating agent pretending to be d ≤ n agents has an incentive
to deviate from Algorithm 2, w.l.o.g., the duplicated agents are a1, . . . , ad (recall the indices 1, . . . , n
′
are not known to the agents).
Let n′ be the size of the ring including the duplicated agents, i.e., n′ = n+ d− 1. The clockwise
neighbor of an′ is a1 = b
1
an′ . Denote ac = b
2
an′ the agent at distance bn
′
2 c counter-clockwise from an′ ,
and note that c ≥ d.
When an′ calls Secret-Transmit to a1, an′ holds the piece R of that transmission until round
n′ − 1. When an′ calls Secret-Transmit to ac, ac+1 holds the piece X of that transmission until
round n′ − 1. By our assumption, the cheating agent duplicated into a1, . . . , ad. Since d < c + 1,
the cheater receives at most one piece (X or R) of each of an′ ’s transmissions before round n
′. So,
there is at least one input that the cheater does not learn before round n′. According to the Full
Knowledge property (Definition 2.4), for the cheater at round n′ − 1 any output is equally possible,
so its expected utility for any value it sends is the same, thus it has no incentive to cheat regarding
the values it sends in round n′ − 1.
Let aj ∈ {a1, . . . , ad} be an arbitrary duplicated agent. In round n′, iaj is known by its clockwise
neighbor b1aj and by b
2
aj , the agent at distance bn
′
2 c counter-clockwise from aj . Since the number
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of counter-clockwise consecutive agents in {b1aj , aj , . . . , b2aj} is greater than dn
′
2 e ≥ n, at least one of
b1aj , b
2
aj is not a duplicated agent. Thus, at round n
′, the input of each agent in {a1, . . . , ad} is already
known by at least one agent /∈ {a1, . . . , ad}.
At round n′ − 1 the cheater does not know the input value of at least one other agent, so it has
no incentive to deviate. At round n′ for each duplicated agent the cheating agent pretends to be, its
input is already known by a non-duplicated agent, which disables the cheater from lying about its
input from round n′ and on.
Thus, the cheating agent has no incentive to deviate, contradicting our assumption.
A.2 Coloring Algorithm
Here, agents are given exact a-priori knowledge of n, i.e., they know the exact value of n at the
beginning of the protocol. We present two protocols for Coloring with rational agents, and discuss
their properties. In both algorithms, whenever an agent recognizes that another agent has deviated
from the protocol, it immediately outputs ⊥ resulting in the failure of the algorithm.
A.2.1 Tie Breaking
In most algorithms with rational agents, a prominent strategy [5, 22, 16] is to create a neutral
mechanism that when two agents’ preferences conflict, the mechanism decides which agent gets its
preference, and which does not. We refer to such a mechanism as tie breaking.
Since agent ids are private and agents may cheat about their id, they cannot be used to break ties.
However, an orientation over an edge shared by both agents, achieved without any agent deviating
from the protocol that leads to it, can be such a tie breaking mechanism for coloring: whenever
neighbors prefer the same color, we break ties according to the orientation of the link between them.
Breaking ties for coloring also requires the orientation to be acyclic, since a cycle in which all agents
prefer the same color creates a ”tie” that isn’t broken by the orientation.
Note that since the agents are rational, unless agent a knows that one or more of its neighbors
output its preferred color pa, it will output it itself regardless of the result of the algorithm, which
is a deviation. Thus, any coloring algorithm must ensure that whenever an agent can output its
preferred color, it does, otherwise the agent has an incentive to deviate.
We create an acyclic orientation by a Renaming algorithm that reaches equilibrium [5]. The
algorithm gives new names 1, . . . , n to the agents, which is in fact an n-coloring of G; however due to
the circumstances described above (each agent should output its preference if none of its neighbors
does), this n-coloring is not enough. Instead, each agent, in order of the new names, picks its
preferred color if available, or the minimal available color otherwise, and sends its color to all of its
neighbors.
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Algorithm 3 Distributed Coloring Using Renaming (for agent a)
1: set T := ∅
2: Run Renaming subroutine
Denote N(v) ∈ N the name of v ∈ V from the Renaming subroutine
Denote t the first round after Renaming was complete
3: for round i = t ; i <= t+ n; i+ + do
4: if N(a) = t+ i then
5: if pa /∈ T then
6: Send pa to all neighbors
7: Set oa = pa
8: else
9: Send m = mink k /∈ T
10: Set oa = m
11: else
12: if received N(v) from neighbor v then
13: T = T ∪ {N(v)}
Theorem A.2. Algorithm 3 reaches Distributed Equilibrium for the coloring problem.
Proof. Let a be an arbitrary agent. Assume in contradiction that at some round r there is a possible
step s 6= sr such that:
Es,r[ua] > Esr,r[ua]
First, it must be shown that an agent does not have an incentive to deviate in the subroutine
in order to affect the output of the entire algorithm. In the case of Algorithm 3, the only deviation
that would benefit a in the Renaming subroutine is to minimize N(a), i.e. ensuring it picks a color
as early as possible. From the building block in [5] we get that the Renaming building block is
an equilibrium for agents with preferences on the resulting names, thus ensuring that there is no
relevant deviation possible in the subroutine as no agent can unilaterally improve the probability of
having a lower N value.
Another property of the Renaming subroutine is that, after its completion, all agents know the
names assigned to all agents in the network.
Consider the possible steps a could take at any round r following the Renaming subroutine:
• Sending a message out of order is immediately recognized, as all N values are known to all the
agents as well as the round number. i.e., in any round r 6= t + N(a), a has no incentive send
any message at all, since it fails the algorithm.
• At r = t+N(a) , a must output a color and send it to its neighbors. If pa /∈ T then a outputs
pa. It also has no incentive not to correctly notify its neighbors that it is its output, as this
notification ensures none of them output pa (as that would result in 0 utility for that neighbor).
If pa ∈ T then the color is taken by a neighbor, and a has no incentive to deviate since its
utility is already 0.
Thus, the algorithm solves Coloring and is an equilibrium.
A.2.2 Improving The Algorithm
The Renaming process induces more than an acyclic orientation of graph G, it is a total ordering
of all agents in the graph. Coloring, however, is in many cases a local property and can be decided
locally [28, 14, 19]. Additionally, the Renaming protocol in [5] uses a costly O(|E| · n2) message
complexity.
We present another algorithm for coloring, detailed in Algorithm 6, which improves the message
complexity to O(|E|n) by computing an acyclic orientation of graph G.
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First, run Wake-Up [5] to learn the graph topology and the ids of all agents. Then, in order of
ids, each agent a draws a random number S(a) with a neighboring ”witness” agent w(a) as specified
in Algorithm 4, and sends it to all of its neighbors. The number is drawn in the range 1, . . . , n and is
different than the numbers of all neighbors of a, which is in fact a coloring of G. However, due to the
circumstances described in A.2.1, this coloring is not enough. By picking a random number with a
witness, the agent cannot cheat in the random number generation process, and w(a) is marked as a
witness for future verification. When done, each agent simultaneously verifies the numbers published
by its neighbors using Algorithm 5, which enables it to receive each value through two disjoint paths:
directly from the neighbor, and via the shortest simple path to the neighbor’s witness that does not
include the neighbor. Then each agent, in order of the values drawn randomly, picks its preferred
color if available, or the minimal available color otherwise, and sends its color to all of its neighbors.
The resulting message complexity of the algorithm is as follows: Wake−Up is O(|E|·n). Drawing
a random number is called n times and thus uses O(|E|) messages in total, to publish S values to
neighbors. Verifying the value of a neighbor uses O(diameter) messages and is called |E| times, for
a total of O(|E| · diameter) messages. Sending the output color to all neighbors uses an additional
O(|E|) messages. The total number of messages is thus O(|E| · n).
Algorithm 4 Draw(T ) Subroutine (for agent a)
Denote X = 1, ..., n \ T . X is the set of numbers not drawn by neighbors
1: w(a) := minimal id u ∈ N(a)
send witness to w(a) . choose neighbor with minimal id as witness
2: r(a) := random{1, ..., |X|} drawn by a
r(w(a)) := random{1, ..., |X|} drawn by w(a)
send r(a) to w(a)
receive r(w(a)) from w(a) . a and witness jointly draw a random number
3: Let q := r(a) + r(w(a)) mod |X|.
Save S(a) := q’th largest number in X
send S(a) to all u ∈ N(a) . Calculate S(a) and publish to neighbors
Algorithm 5 Prompt(u) Subroutine (for agent a)
upon receiving prompt(u) from u ∈ N(a):
1: p := shortest simple path a→ w(a)→ u
send S(a), u via p . If v 6= w(a) is asked to relay S(a), v fails the algorithm
send S(a) to u via e = (a, u) . u validates that both messages received are consistent
18
Algorithm 6 Coloring via Acyclic Orientation (for agent a)
1: Run Wake-Up . After which all agents know graph topology
2: set T := ∅
3: for i = 1, ..., n do
4: if ida = i’th largest id in V then
5: Draw(T )
6: else
7: wait |Draw| rounds . Draw takes a constant number of rounds
8: if received S(v) from v ∈ N(a) then
9: T = T ∪ {S(v)} . Add S(v) to set of taken values
10: for u ∈ N(a) simultaneously do
11: Prompt(u) . Since we must validate the value received in line 8
12: wait until all prompts are completed in the entire graph . At most n rounds
13: for round t = 1, ..., n do:
14: if S(a) = t then . Wait for your turn, decreed by your S value
15: if ∀v ∈ N(a) : ov 6= pa then oa := pa
16: else oa := minimum color unused by any v ∈ N(a)
17: send oa to N(a)
Theorem A.3. Algorithm 6 reaches Distributed Equilibrium for the coloring problem.
Proof. Let a be an arbitrary agent. Assume in contradiction that at some round r there is a possible
step s 6= sr such that:
Es,r[ua] > Esr,r[ua]
Consider the possible deviations for a in every phase of Algorithm 6:
• Cheating in Wake-Up. The expected utility is independent of the order by which agents draw
their random number in Algorithm 4, i.e., the order by which agents initiate Algorithm 4 has
no effect on the order by which they will later set their colors. so a has no incentive to publish
a false id in the Wake-Up building block.
• Drawing a random number with a witness is an equilibrium: Both agents send a random
number at the same round.
• Publishing a false S value will be caught by a future verification process with w(a) when all S
values are verified (step 10 of Algorithm 6).
• Sending a color message not in order will be immediately recognized by the neighbors, since S
values were verified.
• a might output a different color than the color dictated by Algorithm 6. But if the preferred
color is available, then outputting it is the only rational behavior. Otherwise, the utility for
the agent is already 0 in any case.
Thus, the algorithm solves Coloring and is an equilibrium.
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B How Much Knowledge Is Necessary?
B.1 Knowledge Sharing is (2α− 2)-bound
Here we prove Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.4.
Proof. Assume agents have (α, β)-knowledge for some α, β. A cheating agent a’s goal is to choose a
value d, the number of agents it pretends to be, that maximizes its expected utility.
Let k be the number of possible outputs of a Knowledge Sharing algorithm, i.e., the range of the
output function g is of size k. By the Full Knowledge property (definition 2.4), any output is equally
possible. Therefore, without deviation the expected utility of a at round 0 is: Es(0),0[ua] = 1k .
According to Theorem 4.1, Algorithm 2 is an equilibrium for Knowledge Sharing in a ring when
a cheating agent pretends to be n agents or less. Corollary 3.2 shows that when a cheating agent
pretends to be more than n agents, no algorithm for Knowledge Sharing is an equilibrium. Thus,
looking at all possible values of n in the range [α, β], a wants to maximize the probability that d > n
and the duplication increases its utility, while also minimizing the probability that d+n−1 > β and
the algorithm fails.
If a cheats and pretends to be d agents, then necessarily d ≥ α, otherwise according to Theorem 4.1
there is an equilibrium, and the duplication does not increase its utility for any value of n in [α, β].
Additionally it holds that d ≤ dβ2 e + 1, since any higher value of d increases a’s chances of being
caught and failing the algorithm (when d + n − 1 > β), without increasing the number of possible
values of n for which its utility is higher (when d > n and d+ n− 1 ≤ β).
From a’s perspective at the beginning of the algorithm, the value of n is uniformly distributed
over [α, β], i.e., there are a total of β−α+1 equally possible values for n. According to Corollary 3.2
when d > n agent a can increase its expected utility by deviating. Let X > 1k be the utility a gains
by pretending to be d > n agents successfully (i.e., when d+ n− 1 ≤ β and the algorithm does not
fail). Since n is uniformly distributed over [α, β] this has a probability of d−αβ−α+1 to occur. On the
other hand, when pretending to be d ≤ n agents successfully the utility of a does not change and is
1
k , and this has a probability of
dβ
2
e−d+1
β−α+1 . In all other cases d + n − 1 > β and the algorithm fails,
resulting in a utility of 0. Thus, the expected utility of agent a at round 0:
ED,0[ua] = X · d− α
β − α+ 1 +
1
k
· d
β
2 e − d+ 1
β − α+ 1 (2)
By the constraints specified above, the value of d that maximizes (2) is d = bβ2 c + 1, and a will
deviate from the algorithm whenever ED,0[ua] > 1k . To find the f -bound on [α, β] we derive β as a
function of α:
ED,0[ua] = X ·
bβ2 c+ 1− α
β − α+ 1 +
1
k
· d
β
2 e − bβ2 c
β − α+ 1 >
1
k{
β is even β(kX − 2) > 2αkX − 2kX − 2α+ 2
β is odd β(kX − 2) > 2αkX − kX − 2α (3)
From (3) we can derive the following:
1. The inequations are satisfiable only if X > 2 · 1k . Since X ≤ 1, 2-Knowledge Sharing (k = 2)
cannot satisfy the inequations and a never has an incentive to deviate, given any bound. This
proves Corollary 5.4.
2. For Knowledge Sharing, we find the range [α, β] that holds for any k. As k grows large, 1k
nears 0. Assuming the profit when duplication is successful is X = 1, agent a has an incentive
to deviate when bβ2 c+ 1− α > 0. When β is even: β > α− 2 , and when β is odd: β > α− 1.
Thus, Algorithm 2 is an equilibrium for Knowledge Sharing when agents have (α, β)-knowledge
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such that β ≤ α−2, and for any algorithm for Knowledge Sharing there exist α, β > α−2 such
that there is no equilibrium when agents have (α, β)-knowledge. This proves Theorem 5.3.
B.2 Coloring is ∞-bound
Here we prove Theorem 5.5.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 7 which solves coloring in a ring using 2-Knowledge Sharing.
Algorithm 7 Coloring in a Ring
1: Wake-Up to learn the size of the ring
2: Assume an arbitrary global direction over the ring (this can be relaxed via Leader Election [5])
3: Run 2-Knowledge Sharing to randomize a single global bit b ∈ {0, 1}
4: Publish the preferred color of each agent simultaneously over the entire ring
5: In each group of consecutive agents that prefer the same color, if b = 0 the even agents (according
to the orientation) output their preferred color, else the odd agents do.
6: If an agent has no neighbors who prefer the same color, it outputs its preferred color.
7: Any other agent outputs the minimal available color.
It is easy to see that Algorithm 7 is an equilibrium and results in a legal coloring of the ring. It
uses 2-Knowledge Sharing and thus, following Corollary 5.4, it proves Theorem 5.5.
B.3 Leader Election is (α + 1)-bound
Here we prove Theorem 5.6.
Proof. Recall that any Leader Election algorithm must be fair [4], i.e., every agent must have equal
probability of being elected leader for the algorithm to be an equilibrium.
Given f(α) = α + 1, the actual number of agents n is either α or α + 1, decided by some
distribution unknown to the agents. If an agent follows the protocol, the probability of being elected
is 1n . If it duplicates itself once, the probability that a duplicate is elected is
2
n+1 , but if n = α + 1
the protocol fails and the utility is 0. Thus Esdup,a[ua] =
1
2
2
n+1 <
1
n , i.e., no agent has an incentive
to deviate.
Given f(α) = α+ 2, then n is in [α, α+ 2]. If an agent follows the protocol, its expected utility
is still 1n . If it duplicates itself once, the probability that a duplicate is elected is still
2
n+1 , however
only if n = α + 2 the protocol fails. Thus, Esdup,a[ua] =
2
3
2
n+1 >
1
n for any n > 3. So the agent has
an incentive to deviate.
Thus for f(α) = α + 1 the algorithm presented in [4] is an equilibrium, while for f(α) = α + 2
no algorithm for Leader Election is an equilibrium, since any algorithm must be fair.
B.4 Ring Partition is Unbounded
Here we prove Theorem 5.7.
Proof. It is clear that an agent will not duplicate itself to change the parity of the graph, as that will
necessarily cause an erroneous output. So it is enough to show an algorithm that is an equilibrium
for even graphs, when agents have no knowledge about n. Consider the following algorithm:
• Either one arbitrary agent wakes up or we run a Wake-Up subroutine and then Leader Election
[5]. Since the initiator (leader) has no effect on the output, both are an equilibrium in this
application.
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• The initiating agent sends a token which alternatively marks agents by 0 or 1 and also defines
the direction of communication in the ring.
• Upon reception of the token with value m, an agent a does one of the following:
1. If m = 0, send predecessor (denoted p(a)) a random bit ta.
2. Else, if m = 1, wait for 1 round and send successor (denoted s(a)) a random bit ta.
• Upon reception of the neighbor’s bit (one round after receiving the token), set
oa = (ta + ts(a)/p(a) +m)mod2
• As the token arrives back at the initiator, it checks the token’s parity. For even rings, it must
be the opposite value from the value it originally sent.
This algorithm divides every pair of agents to one with output 1 and one with output 0, as the
token value m is different, thus achieving a partition.
We show that it is also an equilibrium. Assume an agent a deviates at some round r. If r is in
the Wake-Up or Leader Election phase in order to be the initiator, it cannot improve its utility since
choosing the starting value of the token, choosing the direction, or being first cannot increase the
agent’s utility. If it is a deviation while the token traverses other parts of the graph, any message
a sends will eventually be discovered, as the real token has either already passed or will eventually
pass through the ”cheated” agent. If a changes the value of the token, a randomization between two
agents will be out of sync eventually at the end of the token traversal, and also the initiator will
recognize that the ring does not contain an even number of agents. During the exchange of ta the
result is independent of a’s choice of value for ta. So there is no round in which a can deviate from
the protocol.
B.5 Orientation is Unbounded
Here we prove Theorem 5.8.
Proof. We show a simple algorithm and prove that it is an equilibrium without any a-priori knowledge
of n or bounds on n. Assuming all agents start at the same round (otherwise run Wake-Up), consider
the following algorithm:
• Each agent simultaneously send a random number (0, 1) and its id on each of its edges.
• For each edge, XOR the bit you sent and the bit received over that edge
• If the result is 1, the edge is directed towards the agent with the higher id, otherwise it is
directed towards the lower id.
• Every agent outputs the list of pairs with id and direction for each of its neighbors.
Since an agent’s utility is defined over its personal output, Solution Preference inhibits agents
to output a correct set of pairs, so a cheater may only influence the direction of the edges. Since
duplication does not create any new edges between the cheater and the original graph, and the
orientation is decided over each edge independently, it does not effect any agent’s utility. Other than
that, randomizing a single bit over an edge at the same round is in equilibrium. So the algorithm is
an equilibrium, and Orientation is unbounded.
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